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13.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to build a theoretical framework that will be 
as simple as possible and yet adequate for econometric estimation and policy 
analysis of the process of exchange rate determination in a multicountry and 
multicurrency  world.  By  using  a  popular  model  of  exchange  rates-ex- 
tended  by  Frankel  (1979)  on  the  basis  of  an  earlier  version  proposed  by 
Dornbusch  (1976)-we  also hope  to lay  the  ground  for more  satisfactory 
tests of its theoretical  foundations.  We do this,  first, by  making the model 
multilateral-until  now  it has been  cast in  a two-country  world-and  sec- 
ond,  by  analyzing  rationally  formed  expectations  about  future  exchange 
rates on the basis of the model’s structural version rather than the reduced- 
form version used by previous commentators. ’ 
Our treatment  of  rational expectations  is, however, limited to the extent 
that we have not assumed rationally  expected  processes  for the exogenous 
variables. Thus we cannot present in this paper the analysis of the effects of 
policy  changes and of  other exogenous  shocks. The characterizing  feature 
of this stage of our research  is the analysis of the stability properties of the 
multilateral  exchange rate  determination  mechanism,  whose  structure  we 
This work is a part of  a larger project developed at the European Community Commission 
(the  Eurolink  Project)  and  aimed  at  linking  the  models  of  at least  four  European  countries: 
Germany, France, the United  Kingdom, and Italy.  The Italian model in the project  is  being 
developed  at  Prometeia  Associates  in  Bologna.  We  thank  C.  Corradi,  F.  Giavazzi,  and 
C. Wyplosz for helpful criticism and suggestions. 
I. The same criticism of  Frankel’s model and tests has recently been made by  Driskill and 
Sheffrin  (1981), who also present  estimates using the rational expectations  hypothesis.  Their 
version of the model, however, is still cast in terms of a two-country world. 
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have estimated under the assumption of  given paths for the exogenous vari- 
ables.* 
In section  13.2 we outline the basic theoretical specification of the model. 
Section  13.3 presents a variant  of the model together with estimates of  be- 
havioral functions for the two alternative specifications of  the model, while 
section  13.4 deals with stability analysis of the system. 
In  section  13.5 we  indicate  in  which  direction our research  is currently 
developing. 
13.2 The Theoretical Model 
Consider any two currencies  (countries)  i,  k  chosen  from the  set  of  n 
countries (currencies) that form the elements of a multilateral trade and pay- 
ments network.  Short-term capital movements ensure a covered interest rate 
relation  that  need  not  be  at  parity  as we  consider  national  markets  rather 
than Euromarkets.  We thus allow transaction costs and exchange controls to 
introduce a wedge 6 into 
(1) 
where i"  are short-term interest rates, Ck  is the forward exchange rate (with 
the  same short-term  maturity) between currency  i and  k, Sjk  is the spot ex- 
change rate, and  Ssk  is the distortion coefficient due to transaction costs and 
exchange controls. 
Because of exchange rate risk,  a spread (6ik)  may also open between  the 
forward rate and the expected future spot rate, 
[(I +  if)/(l  + $)Ir = [(F:k/Sik)  S:,],, 
(2)  F;k,r  = sik,r+s '  6sk,i, 
where Jik,r+s  indicates the value of Sik expected at time t for time t  + s. 
according to the following function: 
(3) 
where lowercase letters stand for logs (of money, m; prices, p;  real income, 
y),  except that 8 = log  (1  +  is),  and  where L stands for equilibrium real 
income. 
We now consider (I) and (2) for a maturity s = 1, and, taking logs (with 
log S  = e),  we write 
(4) 
where ri and rk  correspond to  I-period maturity interest rates and wik = log 
We assume that  the  nominal  quantity  of  money  supplied  is  demanded 
ml,r = (~g,,~  + ply.  1.1 - y.rs.  I  1.r)  . i =  1, . . ., n, 
&ik,r+  1  -  eik,r  = ri,r -  rk,r -  Wik,r; i  =  1,  .  . .  ,  n, 
2.  We are currently extending the model in  the direction of  policy analysis.  Results based 
on the estimation of  monetary authorities'  reaction functions were presented at conferences at 
the  University  of  Illinois  and  the  University  of  Louvain.  We  will publish  these  results  in a 
conference volume edited by  P. De Grauwe and T. Peeters. See Basevi and Calzolari (1982). 445  Multilateral Exchange Rate Determination 
(&  * uik).  In line with the asset market approach to exchange rate determi- 
nation, we assume that the money market is continuously in equilibrium, so 
that m = E;  further assuming that equilibrium short-term real rates of inter- 
est are internationally  equal, substitution of  equation (3) into equation  (4) 
yields 
(5)  Pik,r+  I  - 
- 
+  @i,r  -  nk,r) -  Wik,rr 
where ;Ti are equilibrium rates of expected inflation. 
We assume that  the  deviation  of  real  income  from equilibrium  level  is 
related  to the deviation  of  the  real  exchange  rate (q) from  its  equilibrium 
level  (4)  and  to  the  deviation  of  the  dollar  price  of  oil  from  its  trend 
(v -  C) 
(6) 
where D(L) = cdjLJ  and R(L), similarly defined,  are polynomials  in  the 
lag operator L, such that Ljx, = xr-,. 
- 
Yi,r -  Li,r  = Di(L)(qi,r -  4i,r)  + Ri(L)(vr -  vt);  i 
-  - 1, . . ., n, 
i 
The real exchange rate q is defined as 
(7)  zpJ.ijeij  -  pi  + jti  c  pipj); i  = 1, .  .  ., n. 
j#i 
By  assuming  that purchasing power parity  holds in equilibrium,  it follows 
that 4;  = 0 for all i. 
The current rate of  price change is assumed to diverge from the equilib- 
rium rate of price inflation (Fr)  because of disequilibrium real  income: 
(8) 
Substituting (6) into (8), we obtain 
pi,r+ -  pi,r = Gi(L)(yi -  + Fj,r;  i =  1,  . . .  ,  n. 
(9)  P;.r+  1 -  Pi,r = Hi(L)qi,r + K;(L)(v -  ij)t  + %i,r; 
i  =  1, . . ., n, 
with H(L) = G(L)  D(L)  and K(L) = G(L)  R(L). 
Taking into account that  ek;  =  -eik, that  ekk  = 0, and that the  sum of 
the weights p equals unity, it is possible to reduce (g) to a final expression 
in  terms  of  endogenous  (p,  e) and  of  exogenous  variables  @, ;ii, v,  C, 
and w):~ 
3. The treatment of  and n  as exogenous variables is an intermediate step, to be followed 
by an explicit analysis of the process generating rn (or i);  the choice depends upon whether we 
consider the stock of  money or the rate of  interest as the authorities’ control variable.  More- 
over, w  is only provisionally  included among the exogenous variables: a full treatment would 
include a theory of  exchange risk, while &-the  foreign exchange control coefficient-should 
be  included  among the control  variables.  As  for the short-  and  long-run price of  oil,  it  can 
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(10)  Pf.t+  1 -  Pf,f  = Hr(L)erk,r -  Hr(L)  xplJeJk,t 
J#Z 
J*k 
-Hl(L)  (PI - spfJpJ)t 
+K,(L)(V -  V), + 5r,r. 
Mathematical  convenience and the theory of  international monetary  sys- 
tems suggest choosing a specific country as the one whose currency is used 
as the numeraire of  the system. The obvious candidates for this role are the 
United  States and the dollar. While this choice will  be explicitly  made in 
section  13.3, we  now  simply label the nth country  (currency)  as the refer- 
ence country (currency). We thus have a system of  linear difference  equa- 
tions  in n - l  exchange rates  (ern;  i  =  l, ..  ., n - l) and in n prices 
(pr;  i  =  I, ..  ., n), which,  considering equations (5)  and (lo), can be 
written in matrix form as 
(1  1) 
where the vectors xr+l and x, of the endogenous variables are defined as 
&+I  = a,  + z,, 
&+I  = 
Pl.n;t+~ 
ien- I,n;r+  I 
Pl;t+  I 
Pn;t  +  I 
;  x,  = 
e I .n;r 
en -  1,n;t 
PI;( 
Pn;t 




a1-  an -  - 
Yl  I 






Tn.1 + Kn(L)(v -  - 
4.  As  already  pointed  out, endogenization  of  exchange  risk and of  the process generating 
money supply-and  hence equilibrium price levels and inflation rates-would  change the con- 
tent of  vector z and consequently that of  the matrix 0. 447  Multilateral Exchange Rate Determination 
The square matrix  SZ  is of dimension 2n - 1 and can be partitioned into 
= E;:  21’ 
where QI1  is an identity  matrix  of  dimension  (n - l)(n - l), SZ12 is  a 
matrix of  dimension (n - 1)n: 
a12  = 
a1  -0 
Yl 








while the remaining parts of R are 
a21  = 
a22  = I - ail,  ai 
equal to 
13.3 The Estimates 









is  the Rz1  matrix  augmented  by  a last column 
In order to implemer-- the multilateral  model  0.  exchange rates just pre- 
sented  we  have reduced  the  “world”  to a  set of ten countries:  the  United 
States, Germany, France,  Japan, Canada, the United  Kingdom, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland. The United States has been chosen 
as the nth country for its size and for the dominant role of  its currency  in 
the international  monetary  system. In view of our empirical  aim-which  is 448  Giorgio Basevi and Michele Calzolari 
to estimate a model  to be used for the analysis  of the European  Monetary 
System-we  also considered  Canada, Japan, and Switzerland  as an exoge- 
nous subset of countries. Moreover, we have provisionally  limited the esti- 
mates  of  the structure to five countries:  the  four large  European  countries 
plus the United States.'  Thus our system (1  1) is of dimension 2n - 1  = 9. 
The elements of  i2 are combinations of  the parameters  of equations (3), 
(4), and (6).  Thus, for the five specified countries we estimated the param- 
eters  determining money demand, disequilibrium income, and price  infla- 
tion.  The  sample  is  made  up  of  monthly  observations from  1971.10 to 
1980.12; data sources are given in the statistical appendix.6 
The data were first used to estimate a version of  model  (1 1) modified  by 
the use of current income rather than equilibrium  income in the money  de- 
mand functions. From a formal point of view this modification has the con- 







and of subtracting its augmented version B* to the matrix at2.  The modifi- 
cation  does not  affect the matrices  and i222.  In other words, only the 
exchange rate  equations and  not  the  price  equations are  affected  by  this 
alternative specification of the money demand function. The set of  estimates 
based  on this  modified  version  of  the  model  are presented  in tables  13.1, 
13.2,  and  13.3. The first  rows  in  the  tables  correspond to  ordinary  least 
squares. 
In  order to keep the system as  small as possible  to make the  stability 
analysis in the next section feasible, this first set of estimates-while  using 
5. This choice  means  that  in  our empirical  use  of  system  (11)  the  vector  z  contains, in 
addition to the variables explicitly written above, the exchange rates and prices of the countries 
that are left exogenous to the model. 
6.  In all estimates y  is proxied  by  the index of  industrial  production and ti  has been  con- 
structed by  interpolating y on the basis of  the following function of time: y  = a + pr  - y?. 
The same interpolation is used to construct the equilibrium price of  oil, 7. Table 13.1  Demand for Money: Equation (3) (Monthly Observations, 1971.1&1980.12) 
United States  OLS 
2SLS 
Germany  OLS 
2SLS 
France  OLS 
2SLS 
United Kingdom  OLS 
2SLS 
Italy  OLS 
2SLS 
Constant  Ql  Q12  P  Y  r 
.5148  ,0007  ,0286 
(.16)  (.008)  (.008) 
4.7207  ,0007  .0288 
(  .22)  (.008)  (.008) 
-  4.4759  ,0096  .0438 
(.20)  (.008)  (.007) 
1.5317  ,0091  ,0447 
(.33)  (.008)  (.008) 
-  1.4572  .0018  ,0313 
(.32)  (.OlO)  (.010) 
3.7528  .0018  ,0330 
(.46)  (.OlO)  (.010) 
1.3612  .0042  ,041  1 
(.48)  (.015)  (.015) 
4.2493  ,0378  ,0230 
(57)  (.016)  (.016) 
4.4458  ,0184  .042  1 
(.28)  (.014)  (.013) 
9.5919  ,0176  ,042  I 
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-  6.5247 
(1.38) 
~  10.2036 


































Notes: Standard errors in  parentheses.  Q1  and  412 are  dummies  for January  and  December. D-W  = Durbin-Watson  statistic.  SE  =  standard  error of the 
regression. MDV  = mean of the dependent variable. Table 13.2  Income Disequilibrium: Equation (6) (Monthly Observations, 1971.1&1980.12) 
Constant  YI  41  (v - 3,  D-W  SE  MDV 
United States  OLS 
2SLS 
Germany  OLS 
2SLS 
France  OLS 
2SLS 
United Kingdom  OLS 
2SLS 








-  ,5248 
(.37) 
(.37) 
-  12.0961 
(I .48) 
-  12.0954 
(I  .48) 
-  1.0072 
(.66) 
(.  67) 
-  1.9620 
-  1.8970 
-  ,5312 































Notes; Standard errors in parentheses.  D-W  = Durbin-Watson statistic. SE = standard error of  the regression.  MDV  = mean of  the dependent variable. Table 13.3  Price Functions: Equation (8) (Monthly Observations, 1971.10-1980.12) 
United  States  OLS 
2SLS 
Germany  OLS 
2SLS 
France  OLS 
2SLS 
United Kingdom  OLS 
2SLS 
Italy  OLS 
2SLS 
- 















,0271  ,0290 
(.005)  (.005) 

















,0287  ,0308 





















,056  4.43 
.056  - 
,004  1  6.28 
,004  1  - 
,0003  11.3 
,003  - 
,0005  8.6 
,0005  - 
.13  10.3 
.13  - 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. H  = Durbin-h statistic. SE = standard error of the regression. MDV = mean of  the dependent variable.  LR = likelihood 
ratio to test the linear constraints imposed by  the specification. 452  Giorgio Basevi and Michele Calzolari 
current rather than equilibrium  income in the money demand function-do 
not  allow  for  lags  in  endogenous  variables; that  is, the  polynomials D(L) 
and G(L)  are truncated  at their  first terms  do  and go. Possibly  as a conse- 
quence of this, the estimates in tables 13.1-13.3  denote the presence of first- 
order serial autocorrelation of residuals,  particularly  in the income disequi- 
librium  equations  (but  also  in  the  money  demand  equations  where  our 
theoretical model did not provide for lags). 
Even though, as a consequence, their standard errors are underestimated, 
the  coefficients  of  the  money  demand  functions  (table  13.1) all  have  the 
theoretically  expected  sign  and  are  generally  of  the  correct  magnitude. 
Notice,  however,  that  in  this first set of  estimates we do not constrain the 
price elasticity  of  money  to equal  unity; this  homogeneity  constraint  will, 
on the other hand, be imposed in the second set of estimates, that is, those 
using the basic version of the model with j in the money demand functions. 
In the income equations (table  13.2), the significance of the coefficient of 
the real exchange rate is particularly low in the case of the United Kingdom 
and of  Italy, while its sign appears contrary to theory, but not significant, in 
the case of Germany. The price equations reported  in table  13.3 are only a 
subset of our initial estimates.  In fact, we have first allowed estimation of a 
constant in these equations, to account for the fact that the use of the (long- 
term) nominal interest rate as a proxy for the equilibrium expected inflation 
rate 7~ introduces into the equations the value of the equilibrium real rate of 
interest.  If this is assumed  to be constant  (in line with the assumption  that 
q  = 0),  its  value is estimated  by  the  constant  in  the  price functions.  Our 
initial  estimates-not  here  reported-proved  this  constant  to  be  insignifi- 
cantly different from zero for all countries in our sample. 
To allow  for the  possibility  that  (due to the  simultaneity  of  the  model) 
some of the explanatory  variables  in each equation  are correlated with  the 
error term, we also used two-stage least squares estimation by instrumental 
variables.  We chose as instruments the exogenous variables of the model.’ 
The results are also reported in tables 13.1, 13.2, and  13.3, but they do not 
show a dramatic change of estimated coefficients. 
Because the estimates presented in tables  13.1- 13.3 are generally plagued 
by  high  autocorrelation  of  the  residuals,  we  performed  an  autoregressive 
transformation  of  the  variables  using  the  Cochrane-Orcutt  procedure.  The 
results,  not reported  here,  were unfavorable  to the  theoretical  specification 
of the  model in the  sense that some coefficients, particularly  in the money 
demand function, acquired the wrong sign and/or became insignificantly dif- 
ferent from zero. 
We therefore resumed the basic and simpler model, the one with j  in the 
- 
7.  For practical reasons, only those pertaining to the five countries of the model were used. 
The variables  pertaining  to third CountriesAanada, Japan, the Netherlands,  and  Belgium- 
did not significantly change the results when they were included among the instruments. 453  Multilateral Exchange Rate Determination 
money demand function as formally presented in section 13.2. We estimated 
it, allowing for 3-period distributed lags in the real exchange rate coefficient 
of equation (6) and performing a first-order autoregressive transformation in 
the variables of  all three behavioral equations. In addition, we  constrained 
the coefficient of the price variable in the money demand functions to unity, 
as theoretical considerations would suggest. 
Similarly, we chose to follow the theoretical specification of equations (6) 
and (8) by imposing unitary coefficients to the J  variable in equation (6) and 
to the p,- I  variable in equation (8), and also by  imposing the same estimate 
(except for sign) to the coefficient of y and JJ  in equation (8). 
Tables  13.4-13.6  thus report in the first row of  each country OLS esti- 
mates of equations (3), (6), and (8) according to the specifications  just men- 
tioned. In the case of the United States, poor initial estimates of  the interest 
rate coefficient in their demand for money equation and of the real exchange 
rate coefficient in the income equation induced us to impose values which 
seem reasonable on the basis of  cross-country comparisons or of  results of 
previous studies. 
According to an F-test, the imposed constraint is not rejected by  the data 
in case of the latter coefficient (.005),  while the value of the former (- .85) 
is at the limit of the critical region of  acceptance. On the whole, the values 
of  the  D-W or  h-statistics  in tables  13.4-13.6  indicate that  much  of  the 
problem of  autocorrelation of  the residuals has been eliminated in this new 
set of estimates. 
To allow  for the possibility that  (due to the simultaneity of  the  model) 
some of  the explanatory variables in  each equation are correlated with  the 
error term,  and  to  take  into  account the  interequation covariances in the 
variance-covariance  matrix  of  residuals,  we  also  used  three-stage  least 
squares but,  because of  limited  computer  storage capacity,  we  did  it  by 
taking the three structural equations together country by  country rather than 
by  using the whole 5  x  3 system of equations. This is equivalent to assum- 
ing that  the variance-covariance matrix  of  the  residual is  block  diagonal, 
which implies that we  disregard cross-country effects. The results of  three- 
stage least squares estimations are reported in the second rows of each coun- 
try in tables 13.4-13.6. 
Relative to  their  OLS  estimates,  the  coefficients most  affected by  the 
three-stage least  squares method  are those for the  income variable in  the 
money demand function and for the real exchange rate variable in the  in- 
come disequilibrium function.  Unfortunately, the coefficients for the latter 
do not improve their level of  significance, which remains very low. While 
better estimates could be obtained by  extending the lags already present and 
8. As  a matter of fact this homogeneity constraint would be  rejected for  some countries on 
the basis of a r-test. We chose, however, to impose it  both for theoretical reasons and because 
in the stability analysis of section  13.4 the results are not significantly affected by the presence 
or absence of the constraint. Table 13.4  Demand for Money: Equation (3) (Monthly Observations, 1971.10-1980.12) 
United States  OLS 
3SLS 
Germany  OLS 
3SLS 
France  OLS 
3SLS 
United Kingdom  OLS 
3SLS 
Italy  OLS 
3SLS 













-  .003 
(.002) 




.  05 
~  .28 
(.16) 
.53 
-  .24 
~23) 
(.I31 
-  .29 
(.IS) 
-  .36 
(.lo) 







































,462  -  .85" 
(.012) 
1.503  ~  .8S" 
(.013) 
,287  -3.62 
(.015)  (I  .97) 
1.335  -3.61 
2.92  ~  1.91 
(38)  (1.66) 
3.07  -  1.60 
(.92)  (I  .78) 
1.17  -  .79 
(.05)  (1.84) 
2.17  -  .77 
(.06)  (1.9) 
1.61  -  .41 
(.04)  (1.09) 
2.64  -.so 












D-W  SE  MDV 
2.10  ,009 
2.08  ,008 
2.01  ,011 
2.95  ,011 
1.97  ,011 
2.08  .011 
1.68  ,017 
I .70  ,016 
1.45  .01 I 











Notes:  Stanaara error  in  parentheses. 
MDV  = mean of  the dependent variable. 
"Value imposed a priori F(1,109) = 7.6. 
estimated  with  Cochrane-Orcutt  method.  D-W  =  Durbin-Watson  statistic. SE  =  standard  error of  the  regression. 
f 
















a Table 13.5  Income Disequilibrium: Equation (6) (Monthly Observations, 1971.1&1980.12) 
United States  OLS 
3SLS 
Germany  OLS 
3SLS 
France  OLS 
3SLS 
United Kingdom  OLS 
3SLS 
Italy  OLS 
3SLS 
- 
Constant  Time  4  9-1  q-2  2,  (v -  v), 
,017  -  .01  ,0015  ,002  .0015  ,005  -  .085 
(.096)  (.06)  (a)  (.026) 
,012  -  .01  ,0015  ,002  .0015  ,005  -  ,115 
(.094)  (.03  (a)  (.033) 
.070  ~  .04  ,0808  .0538  ,0269  .I61  -  ,105 
(52)  ~3)  (.125)  (.028) 
,064  -  .04  .0243  ,0324  ,0243  .081  -.I18 
(.051)  (.03)  (1.30)  (.035) 
,133  -.I0  .I125  ,1500  .I125  ,375  -  ,076 
(.039)  (.02)  (.16)  (.025) 
,125  -  .09  ,1188  ,1584  .I188  ,396  -.lo1 
(.39)  (3  (.17)  (.032) 
,019  -  .01  ,0228  ,0304  ,0228  ,076  -  .094 
~03)  (.07)  (.025) 
,021  -  .01  ,0186  .0248  ,0186  ,062  ~. 120 
(.030)  (W  (.031) 
.01  -  .01  ,0260  ,0346  ,026  ,087  -  ,073 
(.09)  C.06)  (.19)  (.048) 
.017  -  .02  ,0513  ,0684  ,0513  .I71  -  .069 
~09)  (-06)  (.21)  (.061) 
P  D-W  SE  R2 
.94  .58  ,011  .09 
.92  .61  ,011  .11 
.87  2.20  ,014 
.86  2.26  .014 
.76  2.48  .019  .I5 
.76  2.49  ,019 
.77  2.12  ,018  .I3 
.77  2.13  ,018 
.81  2.38  .03  1  .11 
.81  2.31  .030 
Nores: Standard error in parentheses. 
in terms of  changes. 
"Value imposed a priori; F(1, 109) = 2.996. 
estimated with Cochrane-Orcutt method. D-W = Durbin-Watson statistic. SE = standard error of the regression. R2  = Table 13.6  mice Functions: Equation (8) (Monthly Observations, 1971.10-1980.12) 
United States  OLS 
3SLS 
Germany  OLS 
3SLS 
France  OLS 
3SLS 
United Kingdom  OLS 
3SLS 
Italy  OLS 
3SLS 
- 



































(.  369) 
,500 
(.358) 
P  H  SE  R2 
.I5  -.I71  ,003  .42 
.15  -.177  ,003 
.30  ,002  ,003  .34 
.30  -  ,038  ,003 
.22  -  .I61  ,003  .37 
.22  -.I21  ,003 
.20  ,069  ,007  .40 
.20  ,066  .007 
.47  -  .I32  ,005  .25 
.46  -  ,120  ,005 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  (3  estimated  with  Cochrane-Orcutt  method.  H  = Durbin's  h-statistic. SE = standard error of  the regression.  R'  = in 
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introducing them in the money and price functions, where they are not pres- 
ent, we have chosen  not to follow this avenue.  In fact, as a result the size 
of our R matrix would be correspondingly enlarged.  As  it is, with the lags 
already present in the q variable of the income equations,  the dimension of 
R  when  the  system  is  transformed  into  its  first-order  canonical  form  is 
6n - 3. This, with  five countries,  makes 27, which is a fairly high  order 
for the characteristic equation to be solved numerically in the next section. 
13.4 Stability Analysis 
The theoretical  model we have used as the basis of our analysis has been 
estimated and tested for stability by Frankel and many other authors.'  In our 
view  one of  the  main  weaknesses  of  the  debate  about  the  model  and  its 
empirical  verification  is  due to the  fact  that  it  has  generally  been  cast  in 
terms of a two-country  world."  To justify  this  assertion,  we may consider 
Frankel's  original contribution  (Frankel  1979).  In  it,  the  deutsche  mark  to 
dollar  (DM/$)  exchange rate  is  shown  to converge  to a  stable path  deter- 
mined by purchasing power parity.  The speed of convergence depends only 
on the parameters  of  the money demand  and price functions of the  United 
States and Germany, regardless of the economic structure and events in third 
countries.  Clearly  this is  not  the  case  when  more  than  two  countries  are 
explicitly introduced into the analysis.  The roots of the characteristic equa- 
tion  that  determine  the  stability  conditions  for the  system depend,  in  the 
general n-countries case, upon the parameters of the  structural equations of 
all n countries. 
Thus,  with  reference  to our system  (ll), while  the  vector  z  drives  the 
endogenous  variables  along  their  equilibrium  path,  the  whole  structure of 
the  matrix  R determines  whether  the  system  converges  again  to that path 
after it is shocked by changes in the exogenous variables. 
Although  relatively  simple  as  a  macroeconomic  model,  our  system  is 
complex  enough to require  an analytical examination  of its stability condi- 
tions.  We have therefore  used  the numerical estimates of the structure ob- 
tained in the previous section to compute the eigenvalues of matrix R. Blan- 
chard  and  Kahn  (1980) have  shown  that  in  a  linear  difference  equation 
system in  which a subset of  variables is forward looking and the remaining 
subset is backward looking, uniqueness and stability of solutions are ensured 
when  there  are as many  roots of  the  characteristic  equation  of  the  system 
with  module larger than  one as there are forward-looking variables,  and as 
9. For criticism  and  defense  of  that  model,  see  the exchange  comments  in  the American 
Economic Review, December  I98  1. 
10. The same criticism has also been made by Driskill and Sheffrin (1981). Notice that tests 
of  the model for different pairs of countries (currencies) have been conducted by many authors. 
All those that we know of, however, remain pairwise tests, and none of them is built within a 
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many with module smaller than one as there are backward-looking variables. 
Our system corresponds to this classification, with  n - 1 forward-looking 
variables (the n - 1 exchange rates) and n backward-looking variables (the 
n prices). 
Table 13.7, in its part A, shows the eigenvalues of matrix fl based on the 
numerical parameters obtained in section 13.3 on the basis of the first set of 
estimates  taken  from  tables  13.1-13.3.  We have  chosen  for this  purpose 
both OLS and 2SLS estimates. The results show that when all five countries 
are included  in the model the eigenvalues do not conform to the Blanchard- 
Kahn criterion  for uniqueness  and  stability of the  solutions.  This seems to 
be due to the wrong coefficient in the income equation for Germany; in fact, 
when we take Germany out of the system and reduce its endogenous part to 
a four-country set (and also when we further reduce it to subsets of three or 
two countries, always excluding Germany), the eigenvalues conform to the 
Blanchard-Kahn criterion. 
Table 13.7A  Numerical Solution for the Roots of the Characteristic Equation of 
System (11) Based on Results of  Tables 13.1-13.3 
OLS  2SLS 
1.0849  .9769  1.1060  ,9826 
1.0645  ,9838  1.0862  .9786 
N=5  1.0434  ,9942  1.0623  ,9959 
1.0330  ,9988  1.0420  ,9998 
I .OoOl  1.0008 
1.0879  ,9769  I.  1073  ,9854 
,9955  I .0586  ,9966  1.0535 
I .0425  ,9870  I .0766  ,9998 




Table 13.7B  Numerical Solution for the Roots of the Characteristic Equation of 
System (11) Based on Results of Tables 13.4-13.6 
OLS  3 SLS 
1.8400  ,9999  I.  8404  ,9999 
1 ,8397  ,9999  1 ,8395  ,9993 
N=5  1.8397  .9998  1.8391  ,9980 
1.8382  .9998  I .8385  ,9968 
-  ,0260  ~  ,0270 
As  the  estimates  of  tables  13.1-13.3  are  plagued  by  first-order  auto- 
correlation of the residuals,  the set of  roots contained in table  13.7A is not 
very reliable.  We have therefore recomputed the eigenvalues on the basis of 
the estimates contained  in tables  13.4-13.6;  while the coefficients  in these 459  Multilateral Exchange Rate Determination 
tables  generally  seem  not  much  more  significant  than  the  corresponding 
coefficients of tables  13.1-13.3,  they are less weakened by the phenomenon 
of autocorrelation.  We do not  report the  18 additional roots introduced by 
the two lags of q that appear in each country’s income equation; in  general, 
these roots introduce a cyclical movement in the adjustment path which was 
not present in the unlagged version of the model, but their module is always 
smaller than  unity.  As for the  remaining  nine  roots,  they  are reported  in 
table  13.7B. 
Contrary to the results of table  13.7A, this new set of roots conforms to 
the stability criterion even when all the countries in our sample are included. 
It is, however, alarming to notice  that the roots with  modules smaller than 
unity  are  dangerously  close to  the  edge of  instability.  We have  therefore 
engaged in  a series of  sensitivity experiments,  by changing the coefficients 
of the matrix  in the neighborhood of their mean values. The results show 
that the  stability of the system is rather robust except when  we change the 
value of the coefficient of the q variable in the income equations. Thus table 
13.8, based only on 3SLS estimates, presents three experiments. In the first 
of  them  (part  A),  the  coefficient  of  the  real  exchange  rate  in  the  United 
States income equation has been increased from .005  to .009. In the second 
(part B), the coefficients of q for all countries except the United States have 
been  increased by  twice  their  standard errors.  Finally,  in  the  third  experi- 
ment (part C) we have increased by  these  amounts the q-coefficients  of all 
countries. 
Table 13.8  Numerical Solutions for the Roots of the Characteristic Equation of 
System (11) under Alternative Values for the q-Coefficient in 
Equation (6) 
(a)  (b)  (C) 
1.9404  .9993  1 ,8436  ,9999  1.8436  .9982 
1.8396  ,9980  1.8404  ,9982  1.8404  ,9958 
1.8391  ,9968  1.8389  ,9958  1.8389  ,9903 
1.8386  -  ,0324  1.8378  ,9903  1.8378  -  ,0328 
1  .ooo1  -  ,0264  1.oO01 
It can be  seen  from the  sets of  roots  thus  obtained  that  the  system  be- 
comes  unstable  when  the  q-coefficient  of  the  United  States  is  increased, 
whereas  it  remains  stable  when  only  the  corresponding  coefficients  of  the 
other countries are changed. 
The robustness of  the system’s stability with respect to alternative values 
for the  parameters  in  the  money  demand  functions  and  in  the  price  func- 
tions, together  with  its  sensitivity to different  values for the coefficient  of 
the real exchange rate in the income disequilibrium equations of the United 
States (in the case of the basic version  of the  model) and for Germany (in 460  Giorgio Basevi and Michele Calzolari 
the  case  of  the  modified  version  of  the  model),  suggest  that  the  model’s 
underlying  theory  should  allow  for  structural  changes  in  equilibrium  real 
exchange  rates.  In other words,  the long-run  purchasing power parity  con- 
dition that is still imposed in our model in the form  of 4  = 0 ought to be 
relaxed.”  In view  of the fact that the United  States and Germany (but also 
the United  Kingdom)  are the two countries  in  our set whose real exchange 
rate has changed most markedly during the sample period, it is not surpris- 
ing that  the  stability  of  the  estimated  structure  depends  so crucially  upon 
those two countries’ income sensitivity to their real exchange rate. 
13.5  Extensions and Concluding Remarks 
In order to perform a detailed analysis of monetary policy in the European 
Monetary System, our model clearly needs extensions and refinements.  Ex- 
tensions  are required  in order to include the  EMS  countries  that  were  left 
exogenous or absent  in  our empirical  section.  More  important,  theoretical 
refinement  of  the  model  should  allow  endogenization  of  the  equilibrium 
price and inflation rates that are here left in  the z  vector; this must be done 
by  specifying  a  process  for the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  by  the  EMS 
countries and the United  States of America.  While the minimal assumption 
is a random walk process,’* a more relevant approach for our purpose is to 
specify policy reaction functions for the monetary authorities. These should 
reflect,  in addition  to the  standard objectives  (control of the  inflation  rate, 
of  unemployment, and of  the balance of payments),  the effect of  the  insti- 
tutional  constraints that have ruled exchange rate management of  our set of 
countries  during  the  sample period-for  example,  the  “snake”  arrange- 
ments-and  that  still determine monetary  and exchange  rate policy  in  the 
present stage of  the EMS.13 
A set of theoretical and econometric problems that arise in this connection 
are due to the changing role of policy variables between being policy instru- 
ments  and being  policy  objectives, and  to the  switches  in  institutional  re- 
gimes that have been taking place through time and across countries because 
of  the  evolution  of  the  European  exchange  rate  arrangements  and  of  the 
varying participation of  European countries to them. 
While work in these directions is in progress,  we hope that the presenta- 
tion of our model,  its estimation, and the analysis of its stability properties 
may already be a useful contribution to the theory and practice of  exchange 
rate modeling. 
11. See Hooper and Morton (1980) for an exchange rate model oriented in  this direction. 
12. This  is  indeed  the  assumption  implicitly  made  by  Frankel  (1979). See  Driskill  and 
13. For an attempt to specify and estimate reaction functions along these lines,  see Basevi 
Sheffrin (1981). 
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Appendix 
Most data, excluding short-term interest rates, are taken  from the Interna- 
tional  Financial  Statistics tapes  distributed  by  the  International  Monetary 
Fund. Money stocks (defined as M2, rcws 34 and 35, except for the United 
Kingdom  where M1, row  34, is used  for lack of monthly data on row 35) 
are end of period  and not seasonally adjusted. Price indices, long-term  in- 
terest  rates,  and  indices of  industrial  production  (seasonally  adjusted) are 
monthly averages. Exchange rates are end of period. 
Short-term interest rates are taken from Morgan Guaranty Trust of  New 
York, World Financial Markets, table headed ‘‘Representative Money-Mar- 
ket Rates,”  and they are end of period. 
The weights pij  in the definition of qi  are taken from an unpublished study 
by the staff of the Bank of Italy, which draws upon data periodically distrib- 
uted in  mimeographed form by  the Directorate for Economic Affairs of the 
European Community Commission. 
COInment  Francesco Papadia 
J. M. Keynes wrote that “practical men, who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual  influences are usually the slaves of  some de- 
funct economist”  (1936, p.  383). In a sense I earn my living, either at the 
EEC  Commission  or in  the  Research  Department  of  the  Banca  d’Italia, 
attempting to minimize the lag with which practical policymakers are slaves 
of economists. I should add, incidentally,  that slavery is not that bad if  you 
can choose your own master,  and the differences  existing in  the economic 
profession  assure,  in  this  respect,  quite  a range  of  choices to a  practical 
policymaker. 
I have  introduced this  autobiographical note just to illustrate  the  spirit 
with which  I read the Basevi and Calzolari paper on which I have the plea- 
sure of commenting. In my effort to bridge the gap between academic econ- 
omists and policymakers,  I  look  at models and their empirical estimates as 
elements to be  inserted  into the decision-making machinery.  I  have to see 
how,  for example,  Basevi  and  Calzolari’s paper can  be  made  relevant  to 
such mundane activities as building the next phase of the EMS or managing 
the exchange rate of the lira. From this perspective, there are two questions 
I would like to put to the authors. 
The paper  is the newest  offshoot of  an  old  but  ever-growing tree.  The 
authors explicitly link their model to the one proposed by Frankel (1979). 
Frankel was extending,  using Frenkel-Bilson  material, Dornbusch’s  (1976) 
model.  Dornbusch,  in turn,  developed the  Fleming-Mundell  model  of  the 462  Giorgio Basevi and Michele Calzolari 
sixties. The new  branch provided by  Basevi  and Calzolari usefully  extends 
the  model  by  (1) making  it  multilateral  instead  of  limiting  it  to  the  two- 
country case; (2) analyzing  rational expectations  on the  basis  of  the  struc- 
tural version of the model rather than the reduced-form one; (3) introducing, 
at least in principle,  institutional constraints such as those of  the EMS. The 
two questions  I would  like to put refer, one to the tree, and one to the new 
branch. 
My first question, which  relates  to the whole  class of  models  to which 
Basevi  and  Calzolari’s  model  belongs,  has  to  do with  the  issue  of  price 
stickiness.  Dornbusch (1976) underlines the key role played  in this class of 
models  by  the stickiness  of  prices  in  the real  goods  markets  as compared 
with  the  instantaneous  clearing  of  asset  markets.  Frankel  (1979), in  turn, 
builds an alternative hypothesis to his real interest  differential model  utiliz- 
ing the Chicago (Frenkel-Bilson) hypothesis of perfectly flexible prices. 
Dornbusch  states  his  uneasiness  in  using,  as a  building  block  of  his 
model, price stickiness which has no satisfactory theoretical explanation, but 
he accepts it as an empirical fact.  Let me state my  uneasiness  in  having to 
choose  between  the  Scylla of  perfectly  flexible  good  prices  and  the  Char- 
ybdis of price stickiness considered  as an act of God, a meta-economic fact 
of  life. Of course it would be nice to have a model  in which price stickiness 
was not  a parameter  but the outcome of an optimizing process and as such 
changed according to circumstances. In this model, the optimum degree of 
stickiness would be reached when the marginal cost of  an additional unit of 
flexibility  was  equalized  to the  marginal cost of  trading  at nonequilibrium 
prices.  That  flexibility  has  a  cost  is  obvious  if  we  look  at  the  resources 
absorbed  by  the  functioning  of  auction  markets  and  imagine,  in  addition, 
the amount of real resources which would be absorbed if, say, salaries were 
recontracted every 5 minutes.  The cost of  trading at nonequilibrium prices, 
in  turn, is obviously  in terms of misallocation of resources. 
The sort of  model closest to the one I  have hinted at  above, of  which  I 
am  aware,  is  the  so-called  surprise  supply  function  proposed  by  Lucas 
(1973).  In  this model  the  cost of  acquiring  information  is  introduced  by 
assuming that no private operator looks at more than one market to estimate 
the actual rate of inflation.  Since, of course, there is no physical constraint 
to this effect, this  limitation  must  be derived  from  an economic  choice:  it 
does not pay to incur the expenses of looking at more than one market. The 
cost of  trading at nonequilibrium  prices,  in turn, is implicit in the fact that 
operators  try  to  minimize  it  making  optimal  use  of  their  limited  infor- 
mation. 
As is well  known, in  this  model  the  slope of  the  Phillips curve  (where 
unemployment is replaced by the deviation between actual income and equi- 
librium income) depends inversely on the informativeness  of  the price sys- 
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As the latter decreases, so does the informativeness of  the price signal as a 
resource allocator: operators attribute a larger and larger share of  observed 
price movements to aggregate rather than to relative inflation, and the steep- 
ness of the Phillips curve increases. 
This  feature  is  interesting for  a practical policymaker because  it  gives 
body to the contention that economic policy has to do with relations among 
optimizing agents  and  is  not  a game against nature.  Thus,  it shows,  for 
instance, that  the agent’s reaction to an  overactive monetary policy which 
increases, under normal circumstances, the variance of  aggregate inflation, 
will be a reduced sensitivity to demand policy actions. As I understand it, 
the Lucas hypothesis on the slope of  the Phillips curve is immediately rele- 
vant for the class of  models  to which the Basevi and Calzolari paper be- 
longs.  In  fact,  the  price  adjustment equation (6) of  the  Basevi-Calzolari 
paper, similar to that of Dornbusch (1 976, appendix), is just a Phillips curve 
with  the  addition of  a long-term rate  of  inflation. In  a sense the  Phillips 
curve is a “price  stickiness”  equation. However, while in  a model such as 
Basevi and Calzolari’s, the slope of the Phillips curve is constant, an act of 
God, and is not derived from economic considerations, in the Lucas model 
it is explained by  an admittedly rough optimizing process. 
At  the end of  this long digression comes my  question. The policymaker 
wanting to use a model similar to Basevi and Calzolari’s is confronted with 
a serious delemma. On one hand, if prices are perfectly flexible there is no 
overshooting of  the exchange rates,  the  relationship between  the  nominal 
interest differential and expected changes in the exchange rate is negative, 
and  monetary policy  does not  influence real output. On the other hand,  if 
prices show some degree of  stickiness it  is likely that  there will  be  over- 
shooting, the relationship between interest differential and the exchange rate 
is positive, and the exchange rate is an important channel of transmission of 
monetary  impulses to real  activity.  Choosing one or the other assumption 
makes  quite  a dramatic difference.  Of  course,  as  a complement of  these 
undetermined theoretical results, the policymaker is also given some empir- 
ical evidence that,  with  moderate inflation, the price stickiness hypothesis 
comes out better.  However, he is also warned that during a hyperinflation 
the flexible price model is more appropriate. This, of course, helps but does 
not really settle the issue. Is a 20% rate of  inflation, like Italy’s, moderate? 
What if inflation reaches 40%? Can one count, for policy purposes, on the 
constancy of  the  degree of  price  stickiness,  that  is,  can  one rely  on  its 
econometric estimates? Is  it by  mere chance that the degree of  price flexi- 
bility, as measured in table  13.6 of  the paper, is lower in  Germany than in 
the other four countries and the German Phillips curve is  correspondingly 
flatter than in the other countries? 
My questions is whether one could not use a model akin to that of  Lucas 
to  answer these  points,  relieve the policymaker of  his  dilemma,  and  get 464  Giorgio Basevi and Michele Calzolari 
closer to the  mythical  figure of  the  “one-handed”  economist  who  cannot 
present  a conclusion  with  his  left  hand  and its opposite with  his  right.  In 
other words,  what  is  wrong  with  the  Lucas hypothesis, or some variant 
thereof,  as  a theory  of  price  stickiness  to be inserted  in models  of the ex- 
change rate such as the Basevi and Calzolari one? 
My second question has to do with  the introduction  of  risk,  exchange 
control, and transaction cost factors in the interest rate parity theory (IRPT) 
(eq.  [l]) and  in the expectation  theory  (ET) of  the forward  exchange rate 
(eq.  [2]).  As 1 understand  it, Basevi  and Calzolari assume that  transaction 
costs and exchange controls impinge on the IRPT, while exchange risk im- 
pinges on the relationship between  forward and expected  exchange rates. I 
have some problems with this distinction.  Of course, transaction  costs im- 
pinge both on the IRPT and on the ET, and they are not trivial even for the 
latter.  1 have estimated (Papadia  1981) that  the  average transaction  cost, 
measured  as bid-ask  interbank  spread, on a  forward  operation  is  close to 
0.4% for the lira, about 0.2% for the French franc and deutsche  mark, and 
0.1% for the  pound.  In  addition, one must  take  into account the fact that 
the spread  changes over time; for instance, on some turbulent  days  it ex- 
ceeded  1% on  lira-dollar  contracts. As far as  I  know, the  most  straight- 
forward way  (Papadia 1981, pp. 224-25)  to take transaction costs into ac- 
count is to correct the  average bid-ask  quotes generally  used  as “forward 
rates”  by adding the spread in the case of expected revaluation and by sub- 
tracting  it  in the case of  expected devaluation. This procedure  is based on 
the argument that  in the case of  expected  devaluation one will sell the cur- 
rency  forward until  the expected  buy spot rate will be equal to today’s for- 
ward  selling  rate  and  vice  versa  for  a  revaluation.  We can  then  use the 
corrected data to make forwardlspot rate comparisons. 
Exchange  controls also  impinge on both  operations,  since foreign  ex- 
change transactions are included in both relationships,  and one could attempt 
to measure  their effect  by the difference between  national and international 
(Euro) rates of  interest on similar assets. The issue of exchange risk  is no- 
toriously  more complicated, and Basevi  and  Calzolari  recognize  this.  If  a 
satisfactory  solution  has been found to this problem, I  am not aware of  it. 
My question in  this  respect  is  whether  one could  not  overlook, in  a  first 
approximation, risk  factors  which  are not  explicitly  considered  in the esti- 
mation, and try to take into account transaction costs and exchange controls’ 
effects as indicated above. Basevi and Calzolari have substantially improved 
the estimation method between  the version presented  at the conference and 
the present version, and not  much can be added here except that  I  have the 
suspicion  that the residuals  of the estimated  regressions  may not be homo- 
scedastic.  In particular, I  suspect that the second half of the sample may be 
noisier  than  the first.  A  test  to make sure  that  this  is  not  the  case would 
have been welcome. 465  Multilateral Exchange Rate Determination 
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